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A NOTE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
PHILIP ELMANt
TE distinctive characteristic of the administrative process is its blending
of different functions and powers in a single agency. The basic duty of an
administrative agency is to implement, using the wide variety of tools given
it by Congress, the regulatory policies established by statute. For example, the
Federal Trade Commission has as its primary task the prevention of the use
in interstate commerce of unfair, deceptive, and anticompetitive business prac-
tices. The Commission has been empowered to perform this task in various
ways: it can investigate; it can prosecute; it can adjudicate; it can guide and
advise; it can conduct and publish economic studies; it can issue rules and
statements of policy.
This fusion of functions has raised questions as to the integrity, as well as
the effectiveness, of the administrative process. I should like briefly to explore,
with particular reference to the Federal Trade Commission, the agency I know
best, one of those questions: Can an administrative agency, which would ap-
pear to be so different an institution from a court, be depended upon to dis-
charge the function of adjudication fairly and impartially?
Although administrative adjudication is a term sometimes used loosely, the
Federal Trade Commission has at least one function which is indisputably
judicial in character. If the Commission has reason to believe that a person is
violating any of the laws it administers, and if it appears that a proceeding
would be in the public interest, the Commission issues a formal complaint.
The proceeding that follows before a hearing examiner is, with minor varia-
tions, similar to a court action governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. If the Commission, on review of the examiner's decision, finds that
the alleged violations of law have been proved, it can (subject to judicial re-
view of its decision) apply sanctions similar to those of a court of equity.
As in a judicial proceeding, the agency's decision must be based on the
record, findings must be supported by the evidence, and the burden of proof
rests upon the charging party. The basic differences between judicial and ad-
ministrative adjudication are not differences of procedure; they are differences
in the institutional environment in which adjudication takes place. For while
adjudication is the sum and substance of the judicial process, it is only a part,
and not always the largest or most important part, of the administrative proc-
ess.
The judicial process is designed to insure that the judge is both neutral and
disinterested. The ideal judge is a detached, even aloof, arbiter of controversies
in whose outcome he has no interest other than that of applying the law fairly
and evenhandedly. Strictly insulated from the initiation and prosecution of
cases, a judge ordinarily has but limited control over his own docket. More.
over, assuming his jurisdiction is general, a judge rarely acquires an expert's
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knowledge of the matters coming before him, further assuring that he will
approach each new case with an open mind.
By contrast, agency members have a more active and affirmative commit-
ment to achieving the goals and effectuating the policies declared by Congress;
their success is measured by the agency's results in striving to attain those
positive objectives. Agency members, furthermore, are expected to be experts,
bringing to each case a specialized knowledge informed by experience. Such
knowledge and experience is not, and should not be, confined to the record
of a particular case.
Even if we go no further, it should be apparent that the requirements of
the administrative process, which do not allow for the shielding of agency
members, as judges are shielded, from responsibility for producing successful
results in advancing the policies announced by Congress, complicate the task
of adjudicating particular cases. But there are other stresses and strains on
agency adjudication that must be noted. Apart from improper external pres-
sures, conflicts of interests, ex parte communications, and the like, there re-
main those subtle institutional influences which no laws, regulations, or codes
of ethics can remove, and which will best be overcome if they are forthrightly
recognized.
It is by no means unusual for an agency to decide that a complaint which
it issued should be dismissed because the evidence or the legal theory on which
it was based did not stand up under adversary attack. For example, of the
appeals decided by the Federal Trade Commission in the past year, about one-
third resulted in dismissals of the complaint. Still, it is likely that decisions of
this kind are generally less reluctantly made by judges than by the members
of an agency. Not having issued the complaint, the judge need not concern
himself with whether a dismissal will be construed as an admission of error
in issuing the complaint and of a waste of the public's and the respondent's
time and money in fruitless proceedings. Nor need he have any apprehension
that dismissal of the case will impair staff morale. And a judge is not sub-
jected to the mischievous suggestion that a case ought not be dismissed be-
cause judicial review is thereby precluded, or the equally mischievous notion
that the success of an agency is measured by the nunber of cease and desist
orders it enters.
Considerations of this sort illustrate the inherent perils to fair and impartial
agency adjudication. Yet there are within the existing framework of the ad-
ministrative process a number of steps that can and should be taken to assure
a greater fairness and impartiality.
First of all, case-by-case adjudication as a technique of administrative law
enforcement should be substantially de-emphasized. As I have discussed more
fully elsewhere,1 litigation is an intolerably slow, costly, clumsy, fragmentary,
1. Elnan, The Federal Trade Commission and the Admnistrative Process, 8 A=m-
TRusT BuLL. 607 (1963); Elman, The Impact of Antitrust on Econoic Growth: The
National Issue, in TRANscRIPT oF THRD CoNFEmRNcE oN ANTrrRusT ru AN EXPANDIZ.G
EcoNomy, MA cH 5, 1964, at 36-47 (1964) ; Ehnan, Ruleinaking Procedures in the FTC's
Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HA.v. L. R v. 385 (1964).
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and inadequate process for resolving the delicate and complex economic issues
that characterize the field of trade regulation. The FTC should make more use
of the other regulatory tools available to it; in the past three years, it has been
doing so with increasing frequency. To the degree that an agency utilizes non-
adjudicatory techniques, it avoids the inherent problem of adjudicative fair-
ness. However, some questions yield only to the case-by-case method of in-
clusion and exclusion; and adjudication is, after all, the method of policy for-
mulation which many agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission,
know best.
It should be emphasized that it is this function of policy formulation which
is the essential and non-delegable duty of an agency member. Therefore, lie
is aided, not hindered, by relief from responsibility for weighing specific evi-
dence against designated persons in particular cases. In relieving the overbur-
dened agency member, internal delegations, both at the complaint-issuance and
appeal-deciding stages, can also do much to assure greater fairness in adjudi-
cation. As I have proposed before,2 the Commission should make more use of
a limited delegation of authority with respect to the issuance of complaints.
Specifically, the members of the Commission should not, at the complaint-
issuance stage, undertake to make their own assessments of the evidence re-
garding violation of law. They should limit their inquiry at that stage to con-
siderations of law and public interest, leaving to a high-level staff official or
group acting under Commission policy directives the determination of whether
there is sufficient evidence of violation in a particular case to warrant prose-
cution. A Commissioner who spends much of his time reviewing investigative
files at the pre-complaint stage may be disabling himself from discharging
those policy-making and adjudicative responsibilities which are his alone and
cannot be delegated to others. But, more important, a Commission member
who does not review the investigative files at the complaint-issuance stage is
not open to the charge of acting as prosecutor and judge in the same case.
Rather, he functions like a judge who, in overruling a demurrer, finds only
that the complaint states a cause of actign - not that it has been proved or
can probably be proved.
At the appeal-deciding stage, greater deference should be accorded to the
findings made by hearing examiners on disputed issues of fact the resolution
of which does not call for application of the accumulated experience and spe-
cial knowledge of the agency. A hearing examiner should be regarded as the
agency's special master on fact questions. The independence of hearing ex-
aminers, specifically their isolation from the complaint-issuance process, is a
substantial safeguard against unfairness in administrative adjudication. We
strengthen that safeguard, and at the same time help the agency members con-
centrate on their basic function of formulating law and policy, by attaching
greater finality to examiners' findings on strictly factual questions. To the ex-




tent that agency members limit their role as judges of the particular facts, they
enlarge their primary role as administrators.
Agency members should concern themselves more with general problems
and broad solutions, and less with individual cases and narrow adjudications.
Agencies were especially created not to decide issues like "Did X Company
do these particular acts charged against it?", but rather to consider questions
such as "Is it unfair and anticompetitive for companies in this industry to
engage in this kind of practice?" The more agency members immerse them-
selves in the former type of question, the less able they are to deal with the
latter.
But greater delegation and other procedural reforms will by themselves ac-
complish little. Improvements in the fairness of agency adjudication vill not
come until agency members frankly acknowledge, and conscientiously seek to
avoid, the dangers inherent in the fusion of functions within the administrat-
tive process. A lapse from fairness in agency adjudication is more likely to
derive from an unconscious yielding to institutional factors than from a cynical
disregard for the duty to judge impartially. This danger could be mitigated if
agency members were alert to it and determined to resist.
Finally, as has been said so often but not yet fully accepted, the highest
standards of integrity, independence, character, and ability must be demanded
in the appointment of members of federal administrative agencies. For, as
Gerard Henderson observed in his classic study of the Federal Trade Com-
mission,3 "Impartiality and fair-mindedness are personal qualities. There are
men who can preserve a detached and judicial point of view, however much
their relation to the controversy may draw them toward one side or another."'
Why not candidly acknowledge that to judge fairly in the framework of the
administrative process may be more difficult and demanding than to judge fair-
ly as a member of a judicial tribunal, and that therefore the standards of fit-
ness for agency appointments should be at least as high as those governing the
selection of federal judges?
The questions raised here are troublesome, and are not to be brushed aside.
They troubled me when I joined the FTC in 1961, and they still trouble me.
One answer - which I have rejected not because iLis too drastic but because
it is not responsive to the real needs of the situation - is to relieve the agen-
cies entirely of their adjudicative function. Such a proposal would create more
problems than it solves and would leave the administrative process less rather
than more effective.5 For if an "administrative court" confined itself narrowly
to the resolution of purely evidentiary issues and assumed no responsibility
for formulating legal standards and policies, it would only be performing a
function better left to independent hearing examiners, as under the present
3. HENDERSON, T E FEmAL. TRADE CoissioN (1924).
4. Id. at 327.
5. This point has recently been made in a cogent and persuasive article by a former
Chairman of the SEC. See Cary, Why I Oppose the Divorce of the Judicial Functilon
From Federal Regulatory Agencies, 51 A.B.A.J. 33 (1965).
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system. But if, as is almost inevitable, such a court found it impossible to
decide particular cases without confronting questions of substantive law and
administrative policy, it would perforce become a competing organ of law
and policy making. The resulting diffusion of responsibility would impede, not
advance, progress towards the solution of the most serious problem of the ad-
ministrative process: the failure of the agencies to translate general statutory
principles into specific, clearly articulated standards and policies.
If one believes, as I do, that the administrative process is an indispensable
tool of democratic government and that the structure of the federal adminis.
trative agencies is basically sound and is likely to remain substantially un-
changed in the foreseeable future, he is under greater obligation to look square-
ly at the perils that seem to inhere in agency adjudication. Facing realities is
usually a good way to begin dealing with them.
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